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Concern with French Jewry during the Holocaust inevitably plunges investigators into problems of accommodation with the Nazis encountered by other historians of the Occupation period.
For in no other country was the Jewish elite more thoroughly integrated into the life of the host society and more deeply identified with its fortunes. Assimilation had been underway for a century and a half when Hitler's armies struck in the West in 1940, and at the head of a Jewish community of about three hundred thousand, half of whom were newcomers, stood a Jewish patriciate little different in manners, beliefs, and political views from its non-Jewish counterparts. As in Eastern Europe, the Jews had forced upon themselves a Jewish Council, known as the Union Generale des Israelites de France (UGIF), which immediately became a tool of the Nazi and Vichy persecution. And as elsewhere in Europe, French -Jews fed the Final Solution: some seventy-five thousand were deported from Drancy, a collecting camp in the northeast of Paris, the overwhelming majority to be murdered in Auschwitz.
France therefore offers an historical arena in which the theories about the Jewish leadership's response to the Holocaust can be examined and subjected to close scrutiny. My own view is that the evidence runs strongly against the accusers. It is entirely proper, of course, to air the weaknesses of Jewish leaders, to note where their judgment was flawed and where they went wrong. But more than twenty years after Hannah Arendt made her sweeping and illconsidered charges against Jewish officials who cooperated with the Nazis, we can afford to be more judicious and more painstaking in particular cases.3
That there were Jewish notables ready and eager to cooperate with the anti-Jewish government at Vichy, fully prepared to participate at the end of 1941 in the newly-established UGIF, there can be no doubt. But we should not imagine that they did so cheerfully or without serious arrie're-pensees. It was clear from the beginning that the Vichy-defined UGIF, nominally set up to control all the non-religious communal affairs of French Jewry, was defined in an ominous and dangerously open-ended way: all Jews had to pay dues to the new body, and its activities could theoretically extend far beyond philanthropy. What might it be asked to do? French Jewish leaders were appalled at the government's arbitrary move and feared the uses to which the UGIF might be put. Yet the background to the formation of this body permits us to see how these leaders perceived their involvement in terms that are not so familiar to us today. Established Jews who became part of this organization knew little of the complex negotiations and strategies that lay behind it. They knew even less about ultimate Nazi plans for the Jews, schemes still being hatched in the inner recesses of the Third Reich.
In Paris since August 1940, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Theodor Dannecker was Adolf Eichmann's representative and head of the Judenreferat, the police branch for Jewish matters that reported directly to Berlin. Dannecker wanted aJudenrat for France, similar to the Jewish councils his SS colleagues had established in Germany and were imposing throughout Nazi-occupied Poland. Working with virtually no manpower and little support from other German agencies on the spot, Dannecker bullied and cajoled the French government into sponsoring the Jewish body. Responding to these pressures, the French convinced the Jewish notables with whom they met that Vichy was acting to forestall Nazi moves to set up the council under the latter's own auspices. Jewish leaders believed their choice was between a German and a French agency. They approached the new organization with great trepidation and considerable internal dispute. But they believed the UGIF to be under French authority, rather than that of the SS, and in this they were largely correct.4
To understand how Jewish notables related to this new body, we need to recognize the supreme demoralization of French Jewry, stunned by two crushing blows in the previous year. Like all Frenchmen, French Jews agonized over their country's defeat-a defeat that was so sudden, so overwhelming and so unexpected. But, in of the Central Consistory, had been a close assosciate of Marshal Petain since the First World War and a classmate of the originally Petainist Cardinal Gerlier of Lyon.7 But the real reason for agreeing finally, after much hesitation, second-thoughts, and agonizing discussion, to work under Vichy control was the feeling that there was no alternative. It is suggested now that these Jews should have had nothing to do with the proposal. Perhaps. At the time, however, working with the French government which had just violated the rights of Jews seemed preferable to giving the Nazis a free hand.
Much has been made of the opposition to plans for the UGIF that emanated from the Jewish Consistory, the pre-existing, officially recognized structure of the Jewish religious community. However, only by distorting Consistorial views through hindsight can the latter be seen as objecting to "collaborating in any way with the enemy."8 Consistorial leaders such as Helbronner certainly protested the imposition of a racial definition of Jews and strenuously objected to the discriminatory laws that followed. Yet when it came to the UGIF, they had great difficulty making up their minds. They were unhappy that negotiations were to a large degree out of their own hands, carried on with representatives of Jewish communal service agencies outside the Consistorial fold. Helbronner and his associates simply believed they could get a better deal. Also, the Consistoire jealously defended its own constitutional standing as a religious association and feared any interference that would further erode the Jewish legal standing in France. For Lambert, heavily involved in discussions with Vichy's anti-Jewish policy coordinator Xavier Vallat, and increasingly convinced of his own rectitude, the Consistorial protesters were "Jewish princes" attempting to protect their own plutocracy. In a revealing passage in his diary Lambert compared himself to Leon Blum in 1936, fending off the hatred of the far Right: "I am feared somewhat the way the Popular Front was feared. The very rich Jews, the majority in the Consistoire, are afraid that [the UGIF] will make them pay too much for the poor. deductions from the reports they carried had at least an independent factual base. Thereafter, news had to be scraped together from the Nazi-or the Vichy-controlled media, from rumor, and from clandestine radio broadcasts from London. The latter certainly accented the positive; so also did the successes of Allied troops fighting in what was, after all, French territory in North Africa. Reinforcing their hopeful analysis was the incorrigible patriotism of these French Jews, whose objectives were far indeed, needless to say, from the attentistes or the men of Vichy. My own conclusion about their prognoses is cautious: they were wrong, but they had good reason for hoping they were right. One can see this policy as evading a central reality of the Final Solution-that sooner or later all Jews were targeted for murder and that the Nazis made no fundamental distinction between assimilated western Jews and their coreligionists from Eastern Europe. This approach also reflects a continuing belief that Vichy might treat native Jews more lightly if only the case on their behalf could be eloquently and insistently made. On this last point UGIF leaders were not entirely wrong, as their occasional-if few-successes showed. More important, perhaps, the effort to secure exemptions bespeaks a legalistic frame of mind that was utterly inappropriate during the Nazi Holocaust. After all, a Jew exempted was only temporarily exempted, and in any case another Jew had to be found to take his place. This failure to comprehend the real nature of the Nazi's intentions provides an additional explanation for the priority given to rescuing native French Jews.
I believe that at
But it should not be assumed that the fate of foreign Jews left the established Jewish leadership cold, just because these men did not always press their case in their correspondence with Petain or Lives indeed hung on their every move. Their "achievements" were few, but all the more valued because they appeared to have been secured against tremendous odds. Meanwhile, of course, the machinery of destruction ground on all around them. To their colleagues, and to the Jews in whose name they claimed to speak, Judenrat chiefs increasingly seemed arrogant, single-minded, and ruthless. From the leaders' vantage point, however, things looked different. Assailed from many quarters at once, increasingly isolated at the top, facing impossible demands, they felt they were the only hope for a squabbling, bitterly divided Jewish community. For Lambert, who certainly fits this pattern, the chief characteristic of his Jewish critics was their ingratitude. He referred often to these Jewish enemies, the "princes" of Judaism, beside whom Vichy and the Germans were at least predictable and frank. To the last he remained convinced that his few exemptions constituted a significant accomplishment, for which he deserved appreciative recognition.'8
The most cruel test of exemptions policy arose with respect to several hundred Jewish children, cared for under the auspices of the UGIF and thus temporarily sheltered from arrest and deportation. Sometimes parents confided children to the UGIF when they could no longer care for them or on the eve of their own deportations; sometimes the UGIF obtained custody of children liberated from the camps; and sometimes the children were simply taken in hand by the UGIF when their parents were arrested. Between July and November 1942, according to Adler, the UGIF placed more than a thousand Jewish children in private homes or shelters of various sorts.19 All of this was done with the authorization of the Vichy or German officials, who eventually attempted to capture these helpless victims and deport them to Auschwitz. Adler cites evidence to show how concerned the official leadership was to preserve the Jewish identity of the children, many of whom were boarded with non-Jewish families or institutions, and he suggests that this may well have limited independent rescue work outside the circuits known to the SS or Vichy police. In any event, the UGIF's scrupulous legalism and insistence on an official structure of placement put the children in grave jeopardy when the French or the Germans were ready to strike. Armed with addresses and lists carefully submitted by Jewish social workers, the Gestapo could swoop down on homes or orphanages at will. By 1944 some UGIF activists were deeply involved in clandestine activity and helped save many of the youngsters by spiriting them away from previous UGIF custody. Georges Edinger, a codirector of the UGIF in Paris, apparently refused to countenance a massive escape of five hundred children in UGIF homes in July, with the result that they were all caught by the SS.20 By that summer the official policy of the UGIF, now rejected by many of its own operatives, seems particularly obtuse.
For some, like Maurice Rajsfus, this episode provides a fitting and shameful epitaph for the "Juifs dans la collaboration." Although not seeking to absolve the UGIF of responsibility in every situation, we should not ignore the simultaneous existence of other trends within the organization, which finally became more active in There may be a masochistic strain in recent Jewish historiography that judges the established Jewish leadership during the Holocaust as particularly manipulative or short-sighted. To the general historian of Europe, however, who surveys this period across a wasteland of appeasement and an inability to understand the Nazis, the Jewish actors in this drama of an entire civilization seem no more blind or weak-willed than any of the other participants. Indeed, their record is not unworthy, taken as a whole. The Jews' relative powerlessness before the murderous anti-Semitism of the Nazi era was a bitter reality to be faced and remains a bitter pill for some to swallow even now. But blaming Jews for this condition, then as now, does not assist understanding, and sometimes serves nefarious political purposes.
Jewish leaders such as I have discussed in this article faced agonizing choices-to intervene with oppressors or not to intervene, to use resources at hand or not to use them, to attempt temporary relief or risk all for open, direct resistance. With the help of careful historical work, we are increasingly able to understand why groups and individuals adopted the positions they did. We may choose to admire some and not others. But let us grant them all some benefit of historical doubt: Who knows, in their place, what we might have done. 
